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Kant’s Political Religion: The Transparency
of Perpetual Peace and the Highest Good
Robert S. Taylor
Abstract: Scholars have long debated the relationship between Kant’s doctrine of right
and his doctrine of virtue (including his moral religion or ethico-theology), which are
the two branches of his moral philosophy. This article will examine the intimate
connection in his practical philosophy between perpetual peace and the highest
good, between political and ethico-religious communities, and between the types of
transparency peculiar to each. It will show how domestic and international right
provides a framework for the development of ethical communities, including a
kingdom of ends and even the noumenal ethical community of an afterlife, and
how the transparency and trust achieved in these communities are anticipated in
rightful political society by publicity and the mutual confidence among citizens that
it engenders. Finally, it will explore the implications of this synthesis of Kant’s
political and religious philosophies for contemporary Kantian political theories,
especially those of Ju¨rgen Habermas and John Rawls.
Introduction
Scholars have long debated the relationship between Kant’s doctrine of virtue
(including his moral religion or ethico-theology) and his doctrine of right,
which are the two branches of his moral philosophy. Some commentators,
such as Allen Wood, have argued for their independence from one another,
suggesting that political mechanisms exist merely to advance our natural
end of happiness and that publicity in the definition, justification, and
implementation of principles of justice is just a lubricant to enhance the oper-
ation of these mechanisms.1 Others, however, have argued for a more inti-
mate connection between the two doctrines. Patrick Riley, for example,
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emphasizes the way that politics serves moral purposes in Kant’s thought and
speaks of the “teleological bridge” that joins the ends of politics (republican
government and perpetual peace) to the ends of ethics (kingdom of ends
and the highest good), the latter of which motivate Kant’s practical postulates
of God and immortality, as we shall see.2 Howard Williams similarly con-
tends that “Kant’s conception of the final goal of politics is the apparently
unrealizable dream of a genuinely ethical community in which the actions
of individuals are guided by (the duties of) virtue” and that the advance
toward it requires (according to Kant) Providence’s “helping hand.”3
As these quotations indicate, this latter group of scholars has helpfully ges-
tured toward but not fully developed the idea that there is a close relationship
between Kant’s philosophy of right and his ethically grounded philosophy of
religion. I will examine this largely unexplored relationship in this article,
showing that Kant’s political theory cannot be properly understood if it is sep-
arated from its ethico-theological context. Although Wood is right to empha-
size the role that universal republicanism and perpetual peace play in
advancing human happiness, they are necessary conditions for ethical com-
munity as well—whether its form is particular (e.g., earthly religious
orders) or universal (e.g., a kingdom of ends in this life or the next one)—
because they encourage the development of our ethical capacities and
thereby aid our obligatory pursuit of the highest good. Furthermore, the
type of transparency specific to the political realm, publicity, and the
mutual confidence it engenders are preparations for the fuller forms of trans-
parency and trust realized in temporal ethical communities and especially in
the afterlife.
To defend these claims, though, I must simultaneously explore Kant’s
ethico-theological arguments for God and immortality, as the essential role
of transparency in these arguments has not been previously noticed. I will
show that warranted belief in our motivational transparency (to both God
and our fellow humans in the afterlife) is required to resolve a tension in
Kant’s practical philosophy—a tension that threatens to undermine his
moral religion—between two conflicting definitions of human ends: as
necessarily achievable goals (second Critique) and as unachievable standards
or criteria (Rechtslehre). In the course of doing so, I shall examine the close
bond between the objective ends of perpetual peace and the highest good,
the former of which serves as a necessary condition for the latter. As we
shall see, the relationship between political and ethico-religious ends explains
why political community acts as a precondition for ethico-religious forms of
community and why publicity lays the groundwork for the imperfect trans-
parency of earthly ethical community and the perfect transparency of a
2Patrick Riley, Kant’s Political Philosophy (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983), 17.
3Howard Williams, Kant’s Political Philosophy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 265,
268.
2 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
noumenal kingdom of ends. I shall conclude the article by briefly discussing
its implications for the contemporary Kantian political theories of Ju¨rgen
Habermas and John Rawls.
The Highest Good, God, and Immortality: A Synopsis
of Kant’s Ethico-Theological Arguments
The highest good for Kant is happiness (Glu¨ckseligkeit) proportioned to virtue
(Tugend), perfectly realized for all finite rational beings (CPrR 5:110–11).4
Virtue refers here to our moral self-perfection, understood as the ability to dis-
charge our duty purely out of respect for the moral law and, consequently,
without the need for any material incentives. Virtue, which Kant calls the
supreme good, is the condition of our worthiness to be happy, which explains
why happiness in the highest good is proportioned to it. The highest (or com-
plete) good consists of happiness in addition to virtue because happiness is
the universal subjective end of finite rational beings. A virtuous but
unhappy species simply could not serve as the highest end for sentient crea-
tures such as ourselves (CPrR 5:25). All willing requires an end, and just as
happiness is the end of empirically practical reason, so the highest good is
4References to Kant will consist of (i) abbreviations for the works from which they
were drawn (unless they are obvious in context) and (ii) the relevant volume and page
references to the standard critical edition of Kant (Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Royal
Prussian Academy of Sciences [Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1900]). The only exception will
be for references to the Critique of Pure Reason (ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen
Wood [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998]), where the supplemental refer-
ences will be to pages in the first (1781 or “A”) and second (1787 or “B”) editions of the
work. What follows is a complete list of the abbreviations I will use, in alphabetical
order by abbreviation, including the English translation used for each text: CF ¼
Contest of the Faculties (Kant, Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970], 176–90); CJ ¼ Critique of the Power
of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000); CPrR ¼ Critique of Practical Reason (Kant,
Practical Philosophy, ed. and trans. Mary Gregor [Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996], 133–272); ET ¼ “The End of All Things” (Kant, Religion within the
Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings, ed. and trans. Allen Wood and
George di Giovanni [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], 193–205);
GMM ¼ Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant, Practical Philosophy, 37–108);
IUH ¼ “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose” (Kant, Political
Writings, 41–53); MM ¼Metaphysics of Morals (consisting of the Rechtslehre
[Doctrine of Right] and the Tugendlehre [Doctrine of Virtue]) (Kant, Practical
Philosophy, 353-604); PP ¼ “Toward Perpetual Peace” (Kant, Practical Philosophy,
311–52); Rel ¼ Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (Kant, Religion, 31–192);
and T&P ¼ “On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of
No Use in Practice” (Kant, Practical Philosophy, 273–310).
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the end of pure practical reason (T&P 8:279–80; Rel 6:4–8). Finally, the
highest good is not distinct from but rather contains all other objective
ends, such as those involved in the imperfect duties of virtue, for example,
the mostly private end of perfecting oneself and the public end of advancing
others’ happiness (MM 6:379–98).5
With this rough definition of the highest good in hand, we can nowmove to
the problem for which God and immortality will provide the solution: the
antinomy of pure practical reason (CPrR 5:113–14).6 Kant’s statement of the anti-
nomy in the Critique of Practical Reason has been roundly criticized and recon-
structed in various ways. In what follows, I will make use of Lewis White
Beck’s own reconstruction of the antinomy.7 As reconstructed, the two
horns of the antinomy are
1. The highest good is possible (implied by pure practical reason);
2. The highest good is impossible (implied by theoretical reason).
As noted above, the moral law obligates us to adopt the highest good as the
architectonic end of pure practical reason, and as Kant repeatedly says
throughout his critical writings, ought implies can (A806/B834; CPrR 5:125;
Rel 6:45, 47, 62).8 What Kant means by this is that to set anything as an
end, we must at least believe it to be possible; thus, if we are obliged to
5Also see Allen Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970),
95–96, and Yirmiahu Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1980), 88–90. Some authors have argued that the highest good is
superfluous to or even inconsistent with Kant’s moral theory; see, for example,
Lewis White Beck, Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1960), 242–45, and Thomas Auxter, “The
Unimportance of Kant’s Highest Good,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 17 (1979):
121–34. Others have defended its role, including John Silber, “Kant’s Conception of
the Highest Good as Immanent and Transcendent,” Philosophical Review 68 (1959):
469–92, and Stephen Engstrom, “The Concept of the Highest Good in Kant’s Moral
Theory,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1992): 747–80.
6An antinomy is “a contradiction . . . between two equally binding laws” (Oxford
English Dictionary, 2nd ed. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989]); also see Katrin
Flikschuh, Kant and Modern Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000), 50–79.
7Beck, Commentary, 247–48. More specifically, I am using Beck’s second reconstruc-
tion, which is itself a modified version of an earlier reconstruction by August Messer,
Kants Ethik (Leipzig: Veit, 1904), 88. Yovel concurs in Beck’s second reconstruction
(Kant and the Philosophy of History, 87 n). Among the numerous other scholars who
have criticized and reconstructed the antinomy is Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion,
25–34, 116.
8Also see Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History, 82–83, who notes that ability
(ko¨nnen) is a necessary condition of obligation (sollen).
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pursue the highest good, we are authorized by pure practical reason to
assume its possibility (CPrR 5:113–14).9 I will return to this point shortly.
Theoretical reason, on the other hand, denies its possibility because there is
no necessary connection between its two constituent elements (virtue and
happiness proportioned to it). First, there is no analytic connection between
them: virtue and happiness are not identical, contrary to the opinions of
ancient Greek Epicureans and Stoics—one can be happy without being virtu-
ous, virtuous without being happy (CPrR 5:111–13, 5:126–27). Second, there
is no synthetic connection between them: virtue cannot be the efficient cause
of happiness because causation is dependent upon not only the will but also
“knowledge of the laws of nature and the physical ability to use them for
one’s purposes” (CPrR 5:113, 124–25). As was the case with the antinomy’s
first horn, the (im)possibility of a synthetic connection between virtue and
happiness is a matter of belief: as Kant explains, “the impossibility referred
to is merely subjective, that is, our reason finds it impossible for it to conceive,
in the mere course of nature, a connection so exactly proportioned as well
as so thoroughly purposive between events occurring in the world in accord-
ance with such different laws [i.e., moral vs. natural laws], though, as with
everything else in nature that is purposive, it nevertheless cannot prove—
that is, set forth sufficiently on objective grounds—the impossibility of it in
accordance with universal laws of nature” (CPrR 5:145; cf. MM 6:354–55).
What follows if the contradiction contained in this antinomy is left unre-
solved? That is, what is the practical import of the antinomy of pure practical
reason? The most serious threats posed by an unresolved antinomy are to
moral motivation and the unity of reason. Kant sees it as a “hindrance to
moral resolve” and fears it will lead to us “seeing [moral] effort as entirely
futile in its effects and thereby flagging in it” (Rel 6:5; CJ 5:446, 452–53).10
How, in short, can we ever motivate ourselves to promote an end that we
believe to be impossible? Equally troubling is the cognitive instability that
results because “the moral way of thinking has no way to persevere in its col-
lision with theoretical reason’s demand for a proof (of the possibility of the
object of morality), but rather vacillates between practical commands and
theoretical doubts” (CJ 5:472). What is needed is some form of reconciliation
between practical and theoretical reason on this matter, one that takes place
on practical reason’s own terms. Kant argues that practical reason should
have priority over theoretical reason but not contradict it, which requires
the latter to accept propositions that, while lacking positive theoretical
9Also, see Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion, 21–23, and his Kant’s Rational Theology
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 21–22.
10Also, see Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion, 155–60. Yovel notes that a belief in the
impotence of moral effort “would produce an attitude of passivity and retreat, under-
mining the psychological possibility of intending to promote the highest good” (Kant
and the Philosophy of History, 102).
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warrant, “belong inseparably to the practical interest” (CPrR 5:119–21, 144 n).
What sort of propositions does he have in mind here?
Kant proposes two postulates of practical reason—God and immortality—to
resolve the antinomy of pure practical reason. He maintains that these two pos-
tulates neither contradict our theoretical knowledgenor receive positivewarrant
from it but that they do “belong inseparably to the practical interest”we have in
believing the highest good to be attainable. How exactly do they fulfill this role?
Let us begin with immortality. The supreme good, virtue, demands perfect con-
formity with and motivation by the moral law (i.e., purity), which is impossible
for a finite rational being at any moment of his existence. What is possible is
“endless progress” toward it, which God sees in one intellectual intuition.
Such progress (in German, Anna¨herung: approach, approximation, or conver-
gence, here towards purity of thewill) is possible, however, only on the supposi-
tion of the immortality of the soul, so that moral self-perfection can continue
unabated (CPrR 5:122–24). If this progress is insufficient to achieve purity—
and it will be—God will eliminate the deficit through “sanctifying grace,” as
he can penetrate to the good disposition (Gesinnung) within us and impute to
us the remainder “as if we already possessed it here in full” (Rel 6:44, 75,
191–92).11 The postulate of immortality (supported by the postulate of God)
is, therefore, a need of pure practical reason, because the perfect virtue it
makes possible is the dominant component of our highest end.
The highest or complete good (happiness proportioned to virtue) demands
something that is beyond human powers, given our limited control of nature,
but we are, nevertheless, obliged to pursue it. We are driven, consequently, to
postulate the existence of some ground that will help us establish this connec-
tion. For human beings, this ground must take the form of a benevolent,
omnipotent deity (God) who wills that morality and happiness coincide
and who possesses the power necessary to make them coincide, be it in this
life or the next (CPrR 5:124–32, 140).
Perpetual Peace as an Unachievable End in Kant’s Rechtslehre
As noted above, Kant maintains that in order to set something as an end, we
must at least believe it to be possible; therefore, if we have a duty to set some-
thing (e.g., the highest good) as an end, we are authorized by the source of
that duty—our own pure practical reason—to believe that end possible so
long as this belief is not ruled out by theoretical (speculative) reason (CPrR
5:113–14).12 The first premise of this argument, that we can only set possible
ends, plays an essential role both here and in the first horn of the antinomy
taken as a whole. If, contrary to this premise, we could set an end without
believing it to be possible, then the antinomy would apparently dissolve:
11Also, see Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion, 120.
12Also, see ibid., 21–23, and Wood, Kant’s Rational Theology, 21.
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our duty to set the highest good as an end would not compel us to believe in
its possibility; consequently, the first horn of the antinomy would be blunted.
Allen Wood offers an interesting counterexample to Kant’s premise:
Suppose, for instance, that I am playing a chess gamewith the chess cham-
pion of the world. I am a novice at chess, and it would not be excessive
humility for me to admit that I have absolutely no chance of beating the
champion, that it is quite impossible in fact for me to win (not logically
impossible, of course, but still quite impossible enough). But even conced-
ing this, I might continue to play as best I can and play to all appearances
with the goal of winning. . . . But here I am, with perfect rationality, pursu-
ing an end (winning the game) while firmly believing that it is quite
impossible for me to attain this end, and this would seem to be ruled
out by what Kant has said.13
Wood argues, however, that this counterexample fails: one can play as well as
one can without actually having the goal of winning (one might, Wood
suggests, be looking for a draw or hoping to last a certain number of
moves). In this case, having the goal of winning would simply be delusional,
a failure on the part of the actor to behave rationally or to understand the
meaning of purposive action.14
Wood’s response to this counterexample is persuasive, as the pursuit of
impossible ends does seem quixotic, even irrational. Nevertheless, the fact
remains that apparently rational people do set themselves (subjectively)
impossible ends, like the chess player of Wood’s example or the moderately
talented amateur runner who sets himself the ultimate goal of running a four-
minute mile. How are we to explain such behavior? One approach might be to
reconsider the definition of “end” that has been implicit in the discussion so
far: roughly, an achievable goal. Consider an alternative, slightly weaker, defi-
nition of an end, which sees it as characterized by four qualities:
1. Guidance: it offers a direction for effort;
2. Feasibility of Approach: movement toward it is possible;
3. Motivation1 (Desirability): it is attractive; and
4. Motivation2 (Monotonicity): being closer to it is more desirable, ceteris
paribus.15
13Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion, 21.
14Ibid., 21–23.
15This last condition is designed to rule out certain odd cases where an incomplete
approach to a desirable object is worse than no approach at all. For example, an
absence of guns may be ideal, but an initial, merely partial approach to this ideal
may make things worse by disarming victims more often than criminals. What
must be “held equal” to maintain the truth of the monotonicity claim here is something
like the maintenance of the gun-ownership ratio between victims and criminals. See
Robert S. Taylor, “A Game-Theoretic Model of Gun Control,” International Review of
Law and Economics 15 (1995): 269–88.
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This weaker notion of an end could also be described as a “standard” or
“criterion.” As stated, this definition is consistent with a variety of beliefs
about the feasibility of the end itself: one might believe the end, so
defined, to be certain, probable, possible, or even impossible. On this
understanding, we could rationally set an end that we believe to be imposs-
ible. Consequently, if we were obligated to set some end, we would not be
compelled to believe in its possibility—or, by implication, in the possibility
of its preconditions (e.g., God and immortality in the case of the highest
good).
This subtle distinction might rightly be considered an exercise in hairsplit-
ting were it not for the fact that Kant, in his Rechtslehre, appears to define an
end in precisely this way, thereby putting his moral arguments for God and
immortality into jeopardy. Kant explicitly says in this work that perpetual
peace, the “entire final end of the doctrine of right,” is unachievable (MM
6:355). I will quote the relevant passages in full given their importance to
my argument:
So perpetual peace, the ultimate goal of the whole right of nations, is indeed
an unachievable idea. Still, the political principles directed toward perpetual
peace, of entering into alliances of states, which serve for continual approxi-
mation to it, are not unachievable. Instead, since continual approximation
to it is a task based on duty and therefore on the right of human beings
and of states, this can certainly be achieved.
What is incumbent upon us as a duty is rather to act in conformity with
the idea of that end [perpetual peace], even if there is not the slightest theor-
etical likelihood that it can be realized, as long as its impossibility cannot be
demonstrated either (MM 6:350, 354; emphasis added).
Notice that perpetual peace, though called “unachievable” in the first
passage, does meet the four conditions of the weaker definition of an end
that I laid out above: it provides direction for effort (Guidance); movement
toward it is possible via approximation (Feasibility of Approach); and both it
and the approach to it are desirable (Motivation1&2). Notice as well that theor-
etical reason neither supports it nor conclusively rules it out. The same holds
for the highest good, as I noted above: “[O]ur reason finds it impossible for it
to conceive” of the highest good being achieved via mere natural means, but
“it nevertheless cannot prove—that is, set forth sufficiently on objective
grounds—the impossibility of it in accordance with universal laws of
nature” (CPrR 5:145). In short, both the highest good and perpetual peace
are subjectively but not objectively impossible. In the second Critique, this
subjective impossibility generates an antinomy of reason that is only resolved
via practical postulates that make the highest good subjectively possible. In the
Rechtslehre, no such antinomy or postulates arise—a difference I think best
explained by their different understandings of ends (as achievable goals
and mere standards/criteria, respectively).
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Unsurprisingly, God plays almost no role in Kant’s Rechtslehre: if the impossi-
bility of perpetual peace is no longer a bar to adopting it as an end, then we
have no need for God as a guarantor of its possibility. This conclusion,
however, has subversive implications for Kant’s moral religion. If we can set
something as an end without believing it possible, then our need for the prac-
tical postulates of God and immortality will disappear. We can set the highest
good as our end without thinking it feasible, devoting ourselves instead to an
approximation to it (just as we do in the case of perpetual peace) and jettisoning
any beliefs regarding supernatural assistance, which will be unneeded for the
more limited moral task at hand and, therefore, unjustified on practical
grounds.16
The Relation of Perpetual Peace to the Highest Good
How powerful is this particular critique of Kant’s arguments for God and
immortality? Is there some way for him to respond? He could just revert to
his claim in the second Critique that we must believe in both the possibility
of any end that we set and its preconditions, a claim that would apply just
as readily to perpetual peace as to the highest good. The resulting modifi-
cation to the Rechtslehre would bring its method closer to that of “Perpetual
Peace,” published only two years earlier, where Kant clearly does see God
16Kant’s own religious beliefs, which are a contested matter, may be relevant in this
context. Some scholars, such as John Hare, hold that he “personally continued to
believe in the central doctrines he was brought up with,” viz. those of Pietist
Lutheranism (The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and God’s Assistance
[New York: Oxford University Press, 1996], 38). Others, such as Ernst Cassirer
(Kant’s Life and Thought, trans. James Haden [New Haven: Yale University Press,
1981], 17–18, 377–97) and Manfred Kuehn, deny this and (in the case of Kuehn)
even maintain that Kant was a lifelong religious skeptic. In his biography of Kant,
Kuehn has Johann Georg Scheffner, Kant’s oldest surviving friend, reflect on Kant’s
religious skepticism at his funeral: “Scheffner was only too much aware of Kant’s
belief that there was nothing to be expected after death. Though in his philosophy
he had held out hope for eternal life and a future state, in his personal life he had
been cold to such ideas. Scheffner had often heard Kant scoff at prayer and other reli-
gious practices. Organized religion filled him with ire. It was clear to anyone who
knew Kant personally that he had no faith in a personal God. Having postulated
God and immortality, he himself did not believe in either. His considered opinion
was that such beliefs were just a matter of ‘individual needs.’ Kant himself felt no
such need” (Kuehn, Kant: A Biography [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001], 2–3). We cannot rule out the possibility, then, that in the Rechtslehre Kant
intended to subvert his earlier religious claims. However, I will proceed on the (defea-
sible) coherentist assumption that all of his works are meant to be consistent with one
another and even mutually supporting. See Yovel (Kant and the Philosophy of History,
215–16) for an unsurprisingly brief discussion of Kant’s infrequent practice of self-
protective esotericism.
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as a “guarantee of perpetual peace” (PP 8:360–62; cf. IUH 8:18, 30–31).17 If
the former work is (as it appears to be) the exception in his writings on this
matter, then making this modification would be a straightforward way to
protect his moral arguments for God and immortality.
Suppose, on the other hand, that we take Kant’s claims about unachievable
ends in the Rechtslehre to be his final word on this subject, given the late date
at which it was published.18 Is there some unnoticed difference between the
highest good and perpetual peace (the highest political good) that would
explain why the practical postulates of God and immortality are needed in
the former case but not the latter? I will explore this possibility in the follow-
ing section. In this section, I want to sharpen my critique of Kant by explicitly
arguing for what was merely assumed above: the fundamental similarity of
perpetual peace to the highest good, a relationship so close that the former
is contained by and serves as a precondition of the latter.
The first, most important similarity between them is that both are objective
ends derived from obligatory maxims (MM 6:382–86). Kant refers to perpe-
tual peace as “the entire final end of the doctrine of right” (MM 6:355). The
highest good is likewise presented as a necessary object of a will “determined
a priori in its form,” that is, by moral law—will as pure practical reason or as
Wille rather thanWillku¨r (CPrR 5:64; MM 6:213–14, 226). A second likeness is
that nature acts as a hindrance to the achievement of both. Natural variation
in languages and religions prevents the formation of a state of nations
(Vo¨lkerstaat) that could bring about perpetual peace. Only a loose pacific fed-
eration (Vo¨lkerbund) offers any hope for a reduction of international conflict,
but each state’s retention of its war-making powers makes the resulting
peace unstable (T&P 8:310–13; PP 8:356–57, 367–68; MM 6:350). As we
have seen, both our finite natural lifespan and our imperfect control over
nature make realization of the highest good impossible without divine inter-
vention, though the unaided approximation of it might still be possible.
17In “Perpetual Peace,” Kant does insist upon a naturalized deity—he uses the terms
“nature” and “providence” rather than God—but the difference seems semantic rather
than substantive: he speaks of nature as a “great artist,” calls its “purposiveness . . . the
profoundwisdom of a higher cause,” and says that we canmake it “comprehensible to
ourselves only if we ascribe it to the end of a creator of the world” (PP 8:360–62).
18Unfortunately, dating Kant’s “final word” on unachievable ends raises some
exegetical issues. The Rechtslehre and Tugendlehre (which together constitute the
Metaphysics of Morals) were published separately in 1797, nearly two years after
“Perpetual Peace.” Scholars differ in their assessment of this work. Kuehn, for
example, sees it as a “compilation of old lecture notes” and states that because of
his advanced age, Kant “simply did not have the energy to satisfactorily pull together
all the different strands of his arguments, let alone polish the work” (Kant, 396). If so,
then “Perpetual Peace” might have a plausible claim to be the “final word.” Wood, on
the other hand, considers it “the definitive form of Kant’s practical philosophy” (Kant’s
Ethical Thought, 13). My own evaluation of it is closest to Wood’s.
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A third parallel is that the desirability of approach to both ends is continu-
ous. I implied in the last section that both could be characterized as ends in the
proposed weaker sense of the term (“end as standard”). This would be consist-
ent, though, with a potential difference between them: the desirability of
approach to one but not the other might be monotonic but discontinuous.
This discontinuity would occur if there were a special value attached to actu-
ally achieving the end in question as opposed to coming very close to doing
so. For example, suppose that you accept the three peaks challenge in Great
Britain (of climbing Ben Nevis, Scafell, and Snowdon in under 24 hours).
Coming close to doing so (e.g., completing it in 25 hours) would certainly
have value, maybe even great value, but the jump in value from doing it in
24 hours instead would probably be significant. In the limit (assuming
weak monotonicity), one could even imagine an end that has no value
unless it is actually achieved; for example, a dike system may have no
value until the last dike is finished, as any gap in the system prevents it
from working at all (see figure 1).19 If the highest good but not perpetual
peace were discontinuous in this sense, we might be able to explain why
Kant postulates God and immortality for the former but not the latter. If any-
thing short of complete attainment of an end were without value, then the
need for divine intercession would be pressing, as full achievement here is
much harder to imagine than a mere approach.
However, nowhere in Kant’s writings does he clearly indicate that one con-
ception but not the other is discontinuous in any sense. Indeed, it is initially
hard to see why discontinuity would occur in either case:
1. Why would there be a discontinuous jump in desirability in moving
from something exceedingly close to perpetual peace (e.g., perpetual
peace minus a border skirmish between Bolivia and Paraguay) to perpe-
tual peace itself?
2. Why would there be a discontinuous jump in desirability in moving
from something exceedingly close to the highest good (e.g., the
highest good minus a somewhat disproportionate virtue and happiness
for one individual at one point in time) to the highest good itself?
A possible answer to this last question is that the concept of the highest good
includes the idea of a necessary (if synthetic) connection between virtue and
happiness, one modeled on natural laws, so that any exception, however
minor, overturns the necessity and undermines its lawlikeness (CPrR
5:113). The persuasiveness of this claim, of course, would hinge on our evalu-
ation of Kant’s assumption that laws (natural or otherwise) must be excep-
tionless to be considered true laws—a claim that is in some tension with
19On the economic theory of dikes, see Jack Hirshleifer, “From Weakest-Link to
Best-Shot: The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods,” Public Choice 41 (1983): 371–86.
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the concept of law implicit in modern social science, for example. Even if we
were persuaded by such a claim, however, it is difficult to see how this discon-
tinuity could be large enough to explain Kant’s postulation of God for the
highest good but not perpetual peace. The mere approach to the highest
good is extremely desirable, as it entails an ever-improving correspondence
between virtue and happiness, which is approved by the “judgment of an
impartial reason” even if it ultimately falls short of a lawlike necessity
(CPrR 5:110). Thus, we are a long way from the limit case outlined above.
If “an impartial rational spectator can take no delight in seeing the uninter-
rupted prosperity of a being graced with no feature of a pure and good
will,” then surely he can take delight in every coincidence of virtue and happi-
ness, up to and including the last one needed to make the correspondence
perfect (GMM 4:393).
I could continue to catalogue the family resemblances between perpetual
peace and the highest good, but such a listing would understate the strength
of the relationship in at least one important respect: a clear implication of
Kant’s claims about the two is that the highest good contains perpetual
peace. This conclusion is a result of the following syllogism:
1. Major Premise: The highest good is “the whole object of pure practical
reason,” that is, it must contain all other objective ends (CPrR 5:109;
cf. GMM 4:433);
2. Minor Premise: Perpetual peace is an objective end—indeed, “the entire
final end of the doctrine of right,” which is the first branch of that doc-
trine of morals yielded by our pure practical reason (MM 6:205, 355);
3. Conclusion: The highest good contains perpetual peace.
What exactly does it mean, though, for the highest good to contain perpetual
peace? Oneway to interpret containment here is to think of perpetual peace as
FIGURE 1.
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a condition for the attainment of the highest good and, therefore, of its two
components, virtue and happiness.
Virtue. In his “Idea for a Universal History,” Kant says that war stifles the
development of man’s latent moral capacities. In “Perpetual Peace,” he
makes the somewhat stronger claim that a rightful political order (domestic
or international) actually encourages the development of these capacities:
by providing assurance that respect for the rights of others will be recipro-
cated, a state or loose pacific federation creates an environment where our
latent capacity to offer such respect “without regard for return” (i.e., out of
reverence for the moral law) can flourish (IUH 8:25–26, 28; PP 8:375–76 n).
Kant makes a similar claim in Religion, where political community is
treated as a precondition for ethical community, an “association of human
beings . . . under the [public] laws of virtue” (Rel 6:94–95). I will further
develop this point later in the paper.
Happiness. Perpetual peace promotes happiness principally by removing
barriers to it. Kant’s depiction of the cost to citizens of expansionary wars is
vivid: the diversion of resources from education, crushing state debts, and
the treatment of citizen-soldiers as “mere machines and tools” in the hands
of the ruler, to be led like animals into war as if “on a hunt, and into battles
as on a pleasure trip” (IUH 8:28; T&P 8:311; PP 8:345; MM 6:345–46). The
abolition of war will remove such hindrances to the growth of culture and
the economy, and this growth will provide citizens with both the intellectual
and material means to realize their idiosyncratic conceptions of happiness.
Perpetual peace is not, of course, a sufficient condition for the highest good.
For example, there is little reason to believe that happiness will be better pro-
portioned to virtue in a peaceful republican world—though at least the richly
rewarded vice of despots will vanish. Still, if the highest good truly contains
perpetual peace, then the full achievement of the former implies the full
achievement of the latter; therefore, perpetual peace is a necessary condition
for the highest good. Notice that this leaves open the possibility that God
and/or immortality may be additional conditions for the achievement of the
highest good, but in this section, at least, we have failed to discover a differ-
ence between the two conceptions that would explain why they would be
conditions for one but not the other.
Opacity, Perpetual Peace, and the Highest Good: Restating
the Ethico-Theological Arguments
Despite this intimate relationship between perpetual peace and the highest
good, there is indeed a key difference between the two. This difference
explains why the practical postulates of God and immortality are needed in
the latter case but not the former: observability. Perpetual peace is an effectively
observable condition of the highest good: we can generally see whether the
world is approaching perpetual peace as a consequence of our political
KANT’S POLITICAL RELIGION 13
efforts to approximate a universal condition of right. For example, we can see
whether wars are becoming less frequent over time, or at least whether they
are becoming less frequent between states of a certain kind (e.g., republican
states) and whether that kind is itself becoming more common (PP 8:350,
MM 6:345–46, 354). Kant himself could perceive “a regular process of
improvement in the political constitutions” of European societies over
history, one that he thought might lead us toward a “republicanism of all
states, together and separately” and to a consequent reduction in the fre-
quency of war (IUH 8:29–30; MM 6:354). Even if we cannot know whether
any peace we achieve is truly eternal, we can knowwhether the preconditions
of perpetual peace—republican government, pacific federation, and cosmo-
politan right—are being approached, and this makes it an effectively observa-
ble end of political action (PP 8:348–60).20
On the other hand, the highest good (and virtue in particular) is unobser-
vable—at least to mortal eyes. Kant is adamant throughout his writings
that we cannot observe virtue in others and remain uncertain about it in our-
selves. Virtue, the “disposition to act from pure duty,” is a matter of motiv-
ation rather than action. Owing to the tendency of self-deception, our own
motives may be as obscure as those of others (Rel 6:51, ET 8:329–30).
Kant’s pessimism here is very difficult to exaggerate. In the famous opening
passage of section 2 of the Groundwork, Kant admits that “no certain
example can be cited of the disposition to act from pure duty,” and he says
in the Tugendlehre that
the depths of the human heart are unfathomable. Who knows himself well
enough to say, when he feels the incentive to fulfill his duty, whether it
proceeds entirely from the representation of the law or whether there
are not many other sensible impulses contributing to it that look to
one’s advantage (or to avoiding what is detrimental) and that, in other cir-
cumstances, could just as well serve vice? (GMM 4:406–8; MM 6:447)
Consequently, the civilizing process—including the approach to perpetual
peace itself—provides no proof that man is becoming more virtuous or that
20This paragraph and later ones may raise the question of howmy paper’s argument
relates to Kant’s philosophy of history. Scholars commonly divide over whether his
historical philosophy is strictly about external progress (i.e., the pursuit of domestic
and international right) or whether it is also strongly related to internal progress
(i.e., the pursuit of a good moral disposition). Robert B. Louden (Kant’s Impure
Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings [New York: Oxford University Press,
2000], 144–52) provides an excellent overview of this debate. As will become
evident, I (like Louden himself) draw lessons from both sides: although history is
necessarily based upon observable things, especially political actions, from which
we draw motivational inferences at our own peril, Kant also believes that political
and especially religious progress are the preconditions for ethical progress—by pro-
moting and at times enforcing good behavior, states and churches help members
develop the capacities and attitudes needed for morality.
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happiness is becoming better proportioned to virtue. Violations of right—
both domestic and international—are certainly evidence of continued
human viciousness, but the obverse does not hold: their absence would not
necessarily be a sign of virtue, because individuals and nations may act right-
fully out of fear or prudence rather than out of respect for the moral law. As
Kant remarks, a republican constitution is possible even for “a nation of
devils,” and greater civility is entirely consistent with greater hypocrisy
and internal corruption (PP 8:366; IUH 8:26; Rel 6:27, 33–34, 93–94).21
Both here and elsewhere in Kant’s writings, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s influ-
ence is prominent.22 In his Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau laments that civi-
lized man, “in the midst of so much Philosophy, humanity, politeness, and
Sublime maxims, [has] nothing more than a deceiving and frivolous exterior,
honor without virtue.”23 Kant similarly worries that “while the idea of mor-
ality is indeed present in culture, an application of this idea which only
extends to the semblances of morality, as in love of honor and outward pro-
priety, amounts merely to civilization [and is] nothing but illusion and out-
wardly glittering misery.” He suspects that there are “many vices hidden
under the appearance of virtue” in relations among fellow citizens and
even intimate friends in civilized societies (IUH 8:26; Rel 6:33–34). As I
noted above, the continuing movement toward perpetual peace and enlight-
enment should remove certain obstacles to happiness and virtue. It may even
encourage the development of reason and discipline via “unsocial sociability”
(IUH 8:20–21). However, what it can never rectify is our fundamental moti-
vational opacity to ourselves and others, an opacity that prevents us from
observing virtue and, therefore, the highest good.
If an end, like perpetual peace, is observable, then we can knowwhether we
are successfully approaching it. However, if it is unobservable, like the
highest good, then we cannot know; our efforts to approximate it may be
failing or even leading us away from it, unbeknownst to us. Kant’s pessimism
about this pursuit is apparent even when he tries to reassure us about it.
Regarding our quest for moral self-perfection, he warns that “one is never
21Also see Sharon Anderson-Gold, “God and Community: An Inquiry into the
Religious Implications of the Highest Good,” in Kant’s Philosophy of Religion
Reconsidered, ed. Philip J. Rossi and Michael Wreen (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1991), 124.
22See, e.g., Richard Velkley, Freedom and the End of Reason: On the Moral Foundation of
Kant’s Critical Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Richard
Velkley, “The Crisis of the End of Reason in Kant’s Philosophy and the Remarks of
1764–1765,” in Kant and Political Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy, ed. Ronald
Beiner and William James Booth (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); and
Ernst Cassirer, Rousseau, Kant, and Goethe, trans. James Gutman (New York: Harper
and Row, 1963).
23Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, ed. and
trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 187.
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more easily deceived than in what promotes a good opinion of oneself.”
Inferences from better “life conduct” over time to an improved moral disposi-
tion, though psychologically necessary, are “conjecture” (Rel 6:68). Therefore,
even if we can be obligated to set an unachievable end, as Kant suggests in his
Rechtslehre, we cannot hope to approximate an end that we cannot observe.
Such an end, like the highest good, would fail to meet even the weaker criteria
for an end listed above: specifically, it would contravene the Guidance con-
dition because an invisible target is, as a practical matter, no target at all.
This conclusion strongly reinforces the concerns raised in an earlier section
about the consequences of failing to resolve the antinomy of pure practical
reason: namely, a sense of futility regarding moral effort and the disunity of
reason. Practical reason commands us to pursue an invisible quarry, for
whose existence theoretical reason provides not the least support. Such a far-
cical hunt will surely bring us to moral despair and set our reason at odds
with itself. Rather than overturning Kant’s antinomy, we have simply restated
and sharpened it: the highest good both can (because it must) and cannot be
approximated. Our duty to pursue it resembles an obligatory game of blind
man’s bluff.
We have not come full circle, however. Our newfound recognition of the
importance of observability in Kant’s moral religion (especially in regards
to our motivational opacity) casts a different light on the practical postulates
of God and immortality, which will serve to resolve the restated antinomy.
Reversing the previous order, let us begin with God. Given our opacity, the
need for the practical postulate of God is obvious: as Kant argues in the
second Critique, the “author of the world . . . must be omniscient in order to
cognize my conduct even to my inmost disposition [Gesinnung] in all possible
cases and throughout the future, omnipotent in order to bestow results appro-
priate to it,” that is, happiness (CPrR 5:140; cf. Rel 6:48, 99). Without allowing
the possibility of God, we could not conceive of how happiness (in this life or
the next) could be proportioned to virtue, given its invisibility and our limited
powers over the physical world. The antinomy would remain unresolved. In
short, though we cannot see virtue ourselves, we are authorized by pure prac-
tical reason to believe in a deity who finds us motivationally transparent.
Let us now turn to immortality. Unlike the distribution of happiness to the
virtuous, the achievement of virtue itself is a task to be carried out byman, not
God, though God can create the conditions for moral self-perfection (MM
6:386).24 Virtue requires the voluntary adoption of an objective end, which
nobody (not even God) can do for us. At the same time, we find it difficult
to imagine how we can approach complete virtue (i.e., purity) in this life,
24Wood correctly distinguishes between two things: achieving virtue for others,
which is impossible, and creating the conditions for that achievement, which is
undoubtedly possible and may even be obligatory, as in the case of the moral
education of children (Kant’s Moral Religion, 74–78).
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as it is a perfection “of which no rational being in the sensible world is capable
at any moment of their existence” (CPrR 5:122). This inability is partly due to
our capacity for self-deception: we can never be confident of the purity of our
own motives (much less that of others), so our struggle for moral self-
perfection must be accompanied by the pursuit of self-knowledge as well.
Only by means of the latter effort can we identify the weaknesses in our char-
acter that must be reformed. Hence, Kant’s suggestion that the postulate of
immortality is a need of practical reason: only this assumption can assure
us of the possibility of ceaseless progress toward perfect self-knowledge
and moral purity for others and ourselves.25
How exactly does the postulate of immortality help us overcome the
problem of self-deception and the related problem of the opacity of other
people, both of which threaten to make our moral efforts futile? If the
human heart is indeed “unfathomable,” as Kant maintained, then we may
only be able to achieve a very limited degree of self-knowledge, regardless
of how long we pursue it. Moreover, why would the motives of other
people become clearer to us in the afterlife? Granted, our ability to infer
their motives might improve with time, but if their ability to hide their
motives did the same, we would simply face a kind of “arms race” of detec-
tion and deception played out over eternity rather than over a human life-
span—an arms race that might be repeated in our effort to understand
ourselves.
Without some assurance that we and our fellows can achieve and in fact
are achieving real progress toward purity, we may despair and begin to
doubt whether any improvement is occurring, leading us to slacken our obli-
gatory efforts to perfect ourselves morally and to assist others in their own
efforts. Given this pressing practical need, we may be justified in believing
that in the afterlife virtue will become visible, not merely to God but to us
as well. Kant points out that “we know nothing about the future, nor
ought we to look for more than what stands in rational connection with
the incentives of morality and their end” (Rel 6:161–62 n). Our need to
believe in the reality of moral progress provides a “rational connection”
between an afterlife of motivational transparency and the demands of the
moral law.26 This view of immortality offers a new gloss on an old piece
25For more on the relationship between self-knowledge and virtue in Kant’s ethics,
see Jeanine Grenberg, Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption,
and Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 8.
26Kant also says that “if after this life another awaits him, he will persevere in it (in
all appearances under different circumstances, yet according to the very same prin-
ciple) and come ever closer to his goal of perfection” (Rel 6:68). If opacity is, as I
have argued, a hindrance to moral progress, then these “different circumstances”
would plausibly include motivational transparency. To be clear, Kant never claims
this himself—I am extrapolating here—but if my overall argument is sound, this exten-
sion would appear necessary to preserve moral motivation and prevent despair.
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of Scripture as well: “For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face
to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am
known.”27 The metaphor of religious enlightenment—of light being
thrown in dark places and obscure visions made clear—nicely depicts the
idea of the afterlife as a realm of transparency, not only between God and
man but also among humans themselves. What we see only dimly now is
the face of God and the goodness of men, yet we may reasonably hope
for a clearer vision in a future life. Our faith in this coming lucidity is war-
ranted by the support it offers to the moral life.
Publicity, Transparency, and Ethical Community
In an earlier section, I emphasized the similarities between perpetual peace
(as the highest political good) and the highest good proper, but in the immedi-
ately preceding section, I appear to have opened up an unbridgeable chasm
between the two. While I present the pursuit of perpetual peace as a
worldly political project, I seem to portray the approach to the highest
good as an otherworldly religious endeavor, one made possible only by the
complete transparency achieved in the afterlife. In fact, the relationship
between perpetual peace and the highest good remains a close one, though
it is mediated by various kinds of ethical community. The type of transpar-
ency peculiar to political life—publicity—can be regarded as a preparation
for the deeper varieties of transparency achieved in ethical community and
the afterlife, which are themselves characterized by growing mutual confi-
dence among participants and a correspondingly diminished need for mech-
anisms of coercion.
Many scholars have written on Kant’s concept of publicity, especially as
presented in the second appendix to “Perpetual Peace” (PP 8:381–86).
Shell, for example, highlights three of its features inter alia: first, the “possi-
bility of publicity is the juridical equivalent of the moral condition of univer-
salizability, providing a test of [the] justice” of any proposed law; second,
the publicity of political acts (made possible by a free press) makes it
much more difficult for a state to adopt and enforce unjust policies; and
third, publicity in both intellectual and political matters, by requiring all par-
ticipants to submit to “the judgment of sound common reason,” helps
advance the acquisition of objective knowledge and the achievement of
271 Corinthians 13:12 (King James Version). Kant would find it entirely appropriate
that moral philosophy guide us in the interpretation of Scripture: he argues in Religion
that “since the moral improvement of human beings constitutes the true end of all reli-
gion of reason, it will also contain the supreme principle of all scriptural exegesis” (Rel
6:112). For a critique of Kant’s hermeneutics, see Yirmiahu Yovel, “Bible Interpretation
as Philosophical Praxis: A Study of Spinoza and Kant,” Journal of the History of
Philosophy 11 (1973): 189–212.
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enlightenment.28 There is an additional, much less noticed feature of Kantian
publicity, however: its coordinating function. Kant begins his discussion of
publicity in “Perpetual Peace” by maintaining that it is a necessary condition
for justice and, therefore, right (PP 8:381). One reason for this is that Kant’s
universal principle of right calls for the reconciliation of all exercises of exter-
nal freedom “in accordance with universal law.” This reconciliation would
be impossible, however, if such a law were kept secret, because the law
itself (as a coordination device) as well as the rewards and penalties attached
to it (as material incentives) can only function effectively if they are made
public (MM 6:230–31).
This public coordination through right (Recht), by openly “checking the out-
break of unlawful inclinations,” increases citizen confidence that others will
behave justly. It lays the foundation for the development of a moral disposi-
tion: “[F]or each [citizen] now believes that he himself would indeed hold the
concept of right sacred and follow it faithfully, if only he could expect every
other to do likewise, and the government in part assures him of this; thereby a
great step is taken toward morality (though it is not yet a moral step), toward
being attached to this concept of duty even for its own sake, without regard
for any return” (PP 8:375–76 n). A publicly rightful political order can, there-
fore, encourage the development of man’s latent moral capacities, making
him able to discharge virtuously his duties of right (MM 6:390–91). This
being said, the transparency achieved via publicity is rather limited: citizens
gain some assurance regarding the rightful behavior of others but remain pro-
foundly uncertain of others’ motivations. This uncertainty partly explains
why right and coercion remain wedded (except in unusual cases, such as self-
enforcing conventions, e.g., which side of the road to drive on). This point is
especially true in the international realm, where the transparency that can be
achieved through pacific federation and cosmopolitan law is even more
limited.
However, domestic and international right creates a framework for other,
deeper forms of community characterized by greater levels of transparency
and trust. A key example is particular earthly religious community, at least
when such community focuses—as genuine religion should, according to
Kant—on moral improvement of congregants and final victory over evil
(Rel 6:94–95). Kant describes such community as familial, where members
strive for a “free, universal and enduring union of hearts” (Rel 6:102; cf.
28Susan Meld Shell, The Rights of Reason: A Study of Kant’s Philosophy and Politics
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 170–73. Insightful interpretations are
also provided by Lisa Ellis, Kant’s Politics: Provisional Theory for an Uncertain World
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 104–11; John Christian Laursen, “The
Subversive Kant: The Vocabulary of ‘Public’ and ‘Publicity,’” in What Is
Enlightenment?: Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions, ed.
James Schmidt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 263–66; and Allen
Rosen, Kant’s Theory of Justice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 181–86.
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MM 6:447). The rituals of these churches (e.g., public singing of hymns, com-
munion) should serve this end by increasing confidence that all members are
united in the pursuit of virtue (Rel 6:195–97, 6:199–200). Their confidence is
severely limited, however, by the earthly opacity of virtue: they can never be
certain of the virtue of their fellow congregants (or their own, for that matter)
and must make uncertain inferences from outward shows of piety, charity,
and so forth. Partly as a consequence of this uncertainty, coercion is still
needed, though its forms are more subtle: apart from the continuing coercion
of the supervisory framework of right, there exist the coercions of religious
hierarchy (e.g., a priestly caste), required ritual performance (e.g., the hajj),
social pressure and monitoring in congregations, among others (Rel 6:123 n
[“compulsion”], 135 n [“still indispensable”]).
Kant sees these more particular forms of ethical community being sup-
planted over time by a universal ethical community, what he calls “ethico-
civil” (vs. “juridico-civil,” i.e., political) society (Rel 6:94–95; cf. GMM 4:433
[“kingdom of ends”]). This cosmopolitan community for the promotion of
virtue and the prevention of vice, a “church invisible,” transcends the
myriad forms of coercion applied by particular ecclesiastical religions.
“[T]he degrading distinction between laity and clergy ceases, and equality
springs from true freedom, yet without anarchy, for each indeed obeys the
law (not the statutory one) which he has prescribed for himself” (Rel 6:101,
122). Although Kant plainly holds juridico-civil society (and its associated
coercions) to be necessary for the creation of ethico-civil society (Rel 6:94),
once the latter society emerges, the former may become superfluous. As
Patrick Riley notes, “if everyone had a completely efficacious good will,
there would be no Kantian politics to study: the kingdom of ends or corpus
mysticum of rational beings would be the only kingdom, and an ‘ethical com-
monwealth’ . . . could embrace the whole of humanity.”29
Some scholars have argued that this secular ideal of a cosmopolitan ethico-
civil society might serve as a practical substitute for Kant’s otherworldly con-
ception of the highest good.30 Unfortunately, the opacity of virtue is again an
29Riley, Kant’s Political Philosophy, 17. I say “may,” because even though a completely
virtuous people would no longer have to be forced to conform to right, they might still
need a public authority to establish and validate rights for purposes of voluntary
coordination. Also note that such superfluity would hinge on virtue (and hence
right) being fully attained, not simply approached.
30In his lectures on Kant, Rawls substitutes what he calls the “secular ideal” of a
kingdom of ends for the highest good, which he considers a Leibnizian corruption
of Kant’s thought (Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, ed. Barbara Herman
[Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000], 317). Similarly, Onora O’Neill asks the
following question in a Tanner Lecture: “[M]ight we not construe the task of moral
progress as a this-worldly, shared and historical, perhaps incompletable task, rather
than as one that will provide each of us an occupation for an eternal afterlife?”
(“Kant on Reason and Religion,” in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, ed. Grethe
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obstacle to the envisioned social transformation: pervasive uncertainty
remains about whether moral progress—one’s own or that of others—is
occurring. We have seen that this uncertainty is itself a hindrance to moral
progress, which is necessary for the eventual elimination of both ecclesiastical
and political coercion. If increasing transparency is difficult to imagine even
within the intimate confines of a church, how could it take place on a
global scale? Kant himself suggests that earthly progress beyond that
achieved through domestic and international right “would require a kind
of new creation or supernatural influence” (CF 7:92; Rel 6:100). Might we
not reasonably believe, then, that God will make virtue visible in this life
rather than the next, so that a kingdom of ends on earth is approached by
means of divine assistance?
Such a kingdom would be a step beyond perpetual peace, which involves
merely rightful relations among people and nations, toward the realization of
the highest good in this world. This earthly supplement to a Kantian afterlife
would be a kind of chiliasm or millennialism (especially postmillennialism),
which in its most generic form is faith in a future period of peace and
plenty on earth achieved through progressive reforms by man and tutelary
interventions by God.31 Such a millenarian variant might even serve as a sub-
stitute for the Kantian afterlife, but only if it could successfully deal with the
problem of moral motivation. As I previously noted, the highest good incor-
porates all other objective ends, including my own moral self-perfection,
which is my chief ethical responsibility. Can the ideal of an earthly
kingdom of ends in the far future, long after I have ceased to exist, really
hope to embrace this most personal part of the highest good? If not, then
Kantian belief in the afterlife may still be practically necessary to supplement
millenarian beliefs: a conscientious moral agent must believe that his own
moral self-perfection as well as that of others can be approached, and a
future worldly kingdom of ends may be an inadequate guarantee of that
possibility.
Figure 2 summarizes the sequence of communities I have just sketched. Far
from being unrelated to the highest good, perpetual peace provides the fra-
mework for its achievement. It underwrites the various forms of ethical com-
munity through domestic and international right and delivers a type of
transparency—publicity—that encourages mutual confidence among moral
agents and prepares them for the deeper types of transparency and trust to
be achieved in ethical community, whether in this life or the next. This
B. Peterson [Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1997], 286). Also see Alexander
Kaufman, Welfare in the Kantian State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 79, and
Velkley, Freedom and the End of Reason, 153.
31For a discussion of the various forms of millennialism, see Frederic Baumgartner,
Longing for the End: A History of Millennialism in Western Civilization (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1999).
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deepening transparency and trust will reassure moral agents of the reality of
progress toward perfect virtue, further encouraging the hard internal struggle
toward this goal and creating the basis for the supernatural provision of a
happiness fitting to it. Even if the approach to the highest good is ultimately
an otherworldly task aided by a divinity, the groundwork for it is laid in this
world via republican government, pacific federation, and cosmopolitan
right—for Kant, the transcendent has its roots in the temporal.
Conclusion
Kant’s political and religious doctrines are vital components of his practical
philosophy, yet their relationship has remained largely unexplored until
now. As we have seen, domestic and international right provides a frame-
work for the development of ethical communities, including a kingdom of
ends and even the noumenal ethical community of an afterlife. The transpar-
ency and trust achieved in these ethical communities are anticipated in right-
ful political society by publicity and the mutual confidence among citizens
that it helps to engender. Political right and perpetual peace encourage the
development of latent ethical capacities and clear away persistent obstacles
to happiness. Thus, they prepare the way for our achievement (with divine
assistance) of the highest good, whether in this life or the next.
One can detect the echo of Kant’s ethico-religious ideal of transparency in
the writings of Ju¨rgen Habermas and other discursive democrats.
Habermas sees deliberative politics as the only form of democratic practice
that can claim legitimacy, and his “ideal speech situation” provides a
model for such politics, one characterized by universal participation, contest-
ability of claims, andmotivational transparency. Unlike Rawls’s “original pos-
ition,” which serves a merely heuristic function, Habermas’s ideal
communication community is the archetype for deliberative democratic
FIGURE 2.
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institutions, including the public sphere.32 The kind of motivational transpar-
ency that he envisions, though—namely, that all participants are known to
debate the validity of norms in good faith—is more of an ethico-religious
ideal than a political ideal, as it presupposes a level of openness and trust
more characteristic of the kingdom of ends or a noumenal ethical community
than of any possible earthly political order. Despite Habermas’s desire to
avoid the metaphysical elements of Kant, his own political commitments
may push him in that direction.33
John Rawls’s political theory may appear less susceptible to metaphysical
interpretations, at least following his “political turn” in the mid-1980s.
However, justice as fairness—even in its political-liberal incarnation—
retains ethical elements, especially the idea that reasonable citizens desire a
just social world “for its own sake,” not only as a means to their own
ends.34 Kant would judge this “virtuous justice”: citizens in a Rawlsian well-
ordered society do the right things for the right reasons, and such a society can
therefore be deemed “an interpretation of the idea of a kingdom of ends,” as
Rawls says in an earlier paper (MM 6:390–91).35 This well-ordered society,
like the kingdom of ends, is governed by principles that serve as “publicly
acknowledged and fully effectivemoral constitutions of social life”; moreover,
there is a “general awareness of their universal acceptance,” so that fellow
citizens can trust each other’s motives.36 As a result, Rawls’s theory may ulti-
mately be as dependent upon an ethico-religious ideal of transparency as
Habermas’s. I have contended in this essay that Kant’s practical philosophy
is an organic whole, with thoroughly integrated political, ethical, and reli-
gious elements. I, therefore, believe that these efforts by contemporary
32Ju¨rgen Habermas, “Discourse Ethics: Notes on Philosophical Justification,” in
Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhart and Shierry
Weber Nicholson (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1980), 86. Habermas warns against
the temptation to “improperly hypostatize the system of validity claims on which
speech is based”; he avers that ideal communication communities are not political
models but rather “thought experiments” (Ju¨rgen Habermas, Between Facts and
Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. William Rehg
[Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996], 322–23). Nevertheless, his own language fre-
quently belies this claim, as when he states that “the theory of communicative
action detranscendentalizes the noumenal realm only to have the idealizing force of
context-transcending anticipations settle in the unavoidable pragmatic presupposi-
tions of speech, and hence in the heart of ordinary, everyday communicative practice”
(19). This statement is properly understood not as a rejection of guiding ideals but
rather as an affirmation of their immanent (rather than transcendent) quality.
33Ibid., 10.
34John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 50.
35John Rawls, Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1999), 264.
36John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1999), 115, cf. 221.
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Kantians to pick it selectively in the service of their secular political theories
are unlikely to be fruitful, though a full defense of this claim will have to
wait for another occasion.37
Habermas and Rawls, like Kant, endorse the political practice of publicity
and consider it a key determinant of overall levels of public confidence in
rulers and fellow citizens.38 While this confidence may appear to serve only
temporal political ends, it prepares the ground for richer forms of confidence
to grow, ones rooted in transpolitical communities and their objectives. Just as
rightful governance imperfectly realizes many ends of morality in this life, so
publicity reflects particular aspects of transparency promised in the afterlife.
Publicity is more than a simulacrum of such transparency, however: it is an
essential component of it, a foundation stone for an otherworldly edifice
constructed within the bounds of mere reason.
37I do not intend to imply by these comments that Habermas and Rawls are antire-
ligious or even that their theories lack a kind of religious ethos—far from it. For the
former’s views on religion and its relationship to philosophy (and critical theory
more specifically), see Ju¨rgen Habermas, Religion and Rationality: Essays on Reason,
God and Modernity, ed. Eduardo Mendieta (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002). Rawls
became more deeply religious during his last two years as a Princeton undergraduate,
but infantry service in the Pacific during World War II permanently changed this, after
which he was “no longer orthodox,” as he put it, though he appears to have retained
some belief in a nonvoluntarist, non-Christian moral theism (“On My Religion,” in John
Rawls, A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith, ed. Joshua Cohen and Thomas
Nagel [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009], 259–70).
38Rawls,ATheory of Justice, 115; Ju¨rgenHabermas, The Structural Transformation of the
Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989), 208–9, and Habermas, Between Facts and Norms,
171, 183.
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